

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.


JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT: ARE WE ON THE RIGHT TRACK?

By

Ian Ferguson
Major, USMCR

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

Faculty Advisor: 
LTC W. F. Brown, USA

5 February 2001

CAPT M. Felmly, USN
COL R. A. Coe, USAF

20010511 021

13

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

2. Security Classification Authority:

3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:

4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

6. Office Symbol:

C

7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

8. Title (Include Security Classification):

JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT: ARE WE ON THE RIGHT TRACK? (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Personal Authors: Major Ian Ferguson, US Marine Corps Reserve

10. Type of Report: FINAL

11. Date of Report: 5 FEB 2001

12. Page Count: 23

12A Paper Advisor (if any): LTC Wilfred Brown, USA

13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Consequence Management, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support, Joint Task Force, JTF-CS, Joint Forces Command, Homeland Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, MSCA, mission

15. Abstract:

Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management (WMD-CoM) has become a new mission area for DoD. The mission was tasked to Joint Forces Command and subsequently a standing JTF was established to support the Lead Federal Agency for domestic CoM. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is now the operational lead for DoD in domestic CoM.

This paper looks at the mission, organization, and command relationships of JTF-CS to determine if it is the correct organization for handling the DoD contribution in this new mission area, and asks: "Are we on the right track?"

In determining if the JTF is on the right track, the mission is analyzed in terms of appropriateness and validity. Examination continues with the organization of the JTF staff and also the functional Task Forces that constitute the JTF. Next, potentially complex command relationships are explored and challenges are identified.

The close look at JTF-CS reveals both strengths and weakness, and points to the need for continual refinement as the CoM mission evolves. Recommendations are made on how the JTF, with the support of JFCOM and the larger DoD community, can improve effectiveness and enhance mission accomplishment. Finally, conclusions are drawn about JTF-CS's role as the lead DoD organization for WMD-CoM.

16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:

Unclassified

X

Same As Rpt

DTIC Users

17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

19. Telephone: 841-6461

20. Office Symbol: C

Security Classification of This Page Unclassified

Abstract of

JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT: ARE WE ON THE RIGHT TRACK?

Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management (WMD-CoM) has become a new mission area for the Department of Defense (DoD). The mission was tasked to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and subsequently a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) was established to support the Lead Federal Agency for domestic CoM. Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is now the operational lead for DoD in domestic CoM.

This paper looks at the mission, organization, and command relationships of JTF-CS to determine if it is the correct organization for handling the DoD contribution in this new mission area, and asks: "Are we on the right track?"

In determining if the JTF is on the right track, the mission is analyzed in terms of appropriateness and validity. Examination continues with the organization of the JTF staff and also the functional Task Forces that constitute the JTF. Next, potentially complex command and support relationships are explored and challenges are identified.

The close look at JTF-CS reveals both strengths and weaknesses, and points to the need for continual refinement as the CoM mission evolves. Recommendations are made on how the JTF, with the support of JFCOM and the larger DoD community, can improve effectiveness and enhance mission accomplishment. Finally, conclusions are drawn about JTF-CS's role as the lead DoD organization for WMD-CoM.

Introduction

Within the past several years, "homeland defense" has become a hot topic within the defense community. Interest in this area has risen because of the perception that the United States has become more vulnerable to a variety of outside threats. One aspect of homeland defense is Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management (WMD-CoM), which entails the timely response and clean-up after a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. In order to better meet the requirements of this emerging mission, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) was formed in October 1999 under U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

The role of JTF-CS in domestic consequence management is still being refined, and should be continually examined as this mission evolves. The role the military should play in WMD-CoM remains ambiguous. Units assigned to JTF-CS, or marked for additional training in a WMD-CoM role need to be carefully considered. Some argue that WMD-CoM is a suitable military mission worthy of support from all services and components. However, the mission may not be suited to every service or component and could be contradictory to the nature of some forces. The designation of a joint command to handle the new CoM mission may enhance the military response to a potential WMD incident.

Thesis

Joint Task Force-Civil Support is the correct organization for handling the Department of Defense (DoD) contribution to WMD-CoM as it is currently missioned, organized, and structured. A Joint Task Force (JTF) is the appropriate level of command to execute operational tasks for the combatant commander, and JTF-CS should be recognized as the military lead for WMD-CoM. However, the JTF-CS role in the overall WMD-CoM arena

will require refinement and continual examination, as well as acceptance by external agencies.

This paper will look at the mission, organization, and command relationships for JTF-CS. The paper examines the areas that may be on the right track and areas that present challenges requiring more consideration.

Background on Domestic WMD Consequence Management

Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management is defined as:

ways and means to alleviate the short- and long-term physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects of a chemical or a biological attack. It describes the coordination of national, regional, and local assets to deal with the effects of such an attack. The term [also] includes preparatory work...¹

The DoD definition of WMD-CoM is:

Emergency assistance to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to those affected by the consequences of an incident involving WMD agents, whether they are released deliberately, naturally, or accidentally.²

The Department of Defense became involved in WMD-CoM in the 1990s when public awareness of terrorist attacks against the US was heightened after the World Trade Center bombing, the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack, and the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. To place increased emphasis on this new threat, DoD created a new position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, adding an additional layer of oversight focused specifically on WMD-CoM.³ Various agencies within DoD were involved in the initial WMD-CoM "start-up". For example, The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Reserve Affairs jumped aboard the CoM bandwagon because early assessment indicated heavy Reserve involvement, pointing to the fact that the Reserve Components were

already "forward-deployed" within the United States. To an observer viewing the initial development of the WMD-CoM mission, it appeared as if there were anxious multitudes vying for involvement in hopes of increased visibility and additional funding.

Prior to the designation of WMD-CoM as a separate mission area, DoD had a system in place designed to meet the requirement of providing military support to civilian authorities (MSCA). The Secretary of the Army has been the "executive agent" for MSCA, exercising authority through the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS), down through FORSCOM (lead operational authority) to the First and Fifth Continental US Armies (CONUSAs).⁴ Within each of the CONUSAs there is an organization called the Response Task Force (RTF). The RTFs were designed to be a clearinghouse for military support during a domestic MSCA operation. This structure is established for response to disaster relief-type tasks that allow for some preparation time. The MSCA structure is service specific and not joint, nor is it operational when compared to military missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders. When WMD-CoM was broken out as a separate task, the mission was delegated to a unified commander.

The mission of domestic consequence management was tasked to JFCOM in the 1999 *Unified Command Plan* (UCP), which states: "[Provide] within CONUS, military assistance to civil authorities (including consequence management operations in response to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction incidents)".⁵

JTF-CS was stood up to provide command and control for DoD forces in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for managing the consequences of a WMD incident in the United States, its territories, and possessions.⁶ JTF-CS is a standing JTF, commanded by a major general, reporting directly to the Commander in Chief (CINC), JFCOM. The operational

chain of command runs from the National Command Authorities to CINC, JFCOM, to Commander, JTF-CS.

The definition of a WMD incident requiring a CoM response becomes an important issue now that the mission has been reassigned from the DOMS chain to JFCOM. JTF-CS has developed an expanded definition of a WMD incident:

a deliberate or unintentional event involving a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological weapon or device, or large conventional explosive, that produces catastrophic loss of life or property.⁷

JTF-CS has included nuclear, radiological, and large conventional explosives within their definition and further expanded JTF potential employment by accounting for accidental as well as intentional WMD incidents. This is in keeping with the definition outlined by DoD. JTF-CS states that their definition helps define their operational focus, but also raises concern that there is no "interagency" consensus definition of WMD-CoM.⁸

A Look at Joint Task Force-Civil Support

Mission

As stated above, JFCOM was tasked in the UCP to provide support for WMD-CoM. The UCP further states, under the category of "Homeland Defense", that a "Joint Task Force Civil Support will be established subordinate to USJFCOM in order to increase the Department's readiness to respond in the event of a WMD incident within the United States, its territories, or possessions".⁹ JTF-CS was officially stood up on 1 October 1999. Soon after establishment, the JTF clearly stated its mission as:

On order the JTF deploys to vicinity of a WMD incident site in support of the Lead Federal Agency, establishes command and control of designated DoD forces and provides military assistance to civil authorities to save lives,

prevent human suffering, and provide temporary critical life support. On order conduct transition operations and re-deploy.¹⁰

This mission statement concisely outlines when to deploy, in what capacity, and for what end. Specified tasks taken from the mission statement tell us that JTF-CS will deploy when a crisis occurs and act as the command and control organization for "designated" DoD forces. It is clearly stated that JTF-CS will be *in support* of the LFA, and delineates the three most important tasks. Finally, we know that the JTF will transition - turn the mission over to *another* agency, implying a lack of permanency for any one particular event.

JTF-CS's implied tasks can be derived as requesting the units that will carry out the WMD-CoM support mission (medical, transportation, engineering, etc.), control of the units assigned to JTF-CS that will carry out the actual support tasks, and liaison with the supported agency (usually the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is the lead agency for WMD-CoM.).

From specified and implied tasks, the major tasks to be accomplished are refined into a mission statement. The purpose of a mission statement is to communicate an idea. Ideas communicated by the JTF-CS mission statement are:

- JTF-CS will deploy to a crisis site when ordered by the chain of command.
- JTF-CS will support the LFA in conducting consequence management.
- JTF-CS will exercise command and control over all military forces assigned to assist in the CoM effort.
- JTF-CS will obtain and employ forces via JFCOM in the CoM effort.
- JTF-CS's main focus is to save lives, prevent human suffering, and provide critical life support; providing capabilities that augment LFA efforts and are akin to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
- JTF-CS will disengage from the CoM mission and turn its functions over to local, state, or federal authorities at some point in time.

Simplified, JTF-CS is the lead military responder for a domestic WMD consequence management mission when DoD support is requested.

In addition to defining the mission, an effective mission statement is also valid and appropriate. First, the mission source is the *Unified Command Plan*, and was assigned by the National Command Authorities. This, in itself, makes it valid -- policy makers at the highest level of our government have deemed the mission to be important, and have assigned it to the CINC. The CINC formed JTF-CS, and the JTF has clearly delineated their task. Furthermore, the JTF-CS role in domestic CoM is to support the LFA, not replace the civil government, nor take charge of the civilian efforts. Finally, the use of DoD assets to help in saving lives, preventing suffering, and providing critical life support is valid from a humanitarian perspective and in providing assistance to American citizens.

Appropriateness of the mission can be addressed by determining if the mission has been assigned to the correct organization. JTFs are established by a combatant commander (CINC) on a "geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective".¹¹ JTF-CS fits the listed parameters in that it has been established by JFCOM, is limited to the U.S., territories, and possessions and has the limited objective of providing support for WMD CoM. Furthermore, a JTF is the appropriate level of organization to deal with the specific mission of WMD CoM because a focused joint force has both the mandate and the resource pool to concentrate assets on the specified mission. The assigned mission "should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort".¹² The assigned mission, which is complex and ever-evolving, also meets these criteria.

After analyzing the mission, one can conclude that the mission is appropriate for JTF-CS. The next step is to examine JTF-CS's organizational capability to execute the mission.

Organization

When examining organization, a key point is that the JTF-CS structure should facilitate command and control as the DoD responder for domestic WMD-CoM. The JTF-CS headquarters is organized like other JTFs in that it has a commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and staff directorates. Staff directorates include J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 (Operations), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans), and J-6 (Communications). An additional element of the JTF-CS staff structure is the directorate labeled the Interagency Coordination Element (ICE).¹³ The addition of the ICE is a creditable idea when considering the extremely complex nature of CoM operations and the large number of "players" external to JTF-CS. As the CoM mission continues to evolve, the ICE should be heavily utilized and will play a pivotal role on the JTF-CS staff. The JTF-CS staff can therefore be viewed as having a simple and standard structure, easily understood by both military and non-military personnel, and incorporating a logical modification to address specific requirements related to the CoM mission.

When one examines the structure of any unit, the real "workers" of that unit are the subordinate units employed by the parent command. For example, when viewing any generic JTF, the "teeth" of that JTF resides in the operational components - the weapons systems, aircraft, equipment, and most importantly the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who employ the weapons and equipment. The "teeth" of JTF-CS lies in its functional components, called Task Forces (TFs), which are employed by JTF-CS during a CoM operation. The functional components are TF Medical, TF Logistics, TF Aviation, TF Engineer, TF Ground Transportation, TF Life Saving, and TF Security. There is also a TF

Liaison that is under tactical control (TACON) of the JTF.¹⁴ Figure 1 below illustrates the organizational structure:




Figure 1- Joint Task Force-Civil Support basic organizational structure¹⁵

The functional components for JTF-CS are not standing entities, but will be stood up and employed based upon mission analysis for a specific situation. Therefore, not all the functional TFs will be used if/when JTF-CS is called to execute a CoM mission. The TFs that are employed will depend upon the needs of the LFA. For example, if FEMA, as the supported agency, requests DoD support to fill a transportation shortfall, JTF-CS may employ TF Aviation and TF Ground Transportation, tailoring those assets to meet the actual requirements. This illustrates effective use of resources based upon the concept of task organization and is consistent with the purpose of forming a JTF -- to use the right tool for the right job.

A limitation of this organizational structure is that there are no permanently assigned units to JTF-CS, nor are forces assigned or apportioned to JTF-CS in any standing plans. The standing JTF is purely the headquarters. The subordinate units that "flesh out" the JTF will

come from forces assigned to JFCOM, or other forces requested by JFCOM to support a specific CoM mission.¹⁶

While a lack of assigned or apportioned forces may be a weak point, JTF-CS has built in flexibility by planning on employing units as "Force Packages" (FPs). The force package concept is designed to support the need to prioritize force flow based on capabilities.¹⁷ There are three planned force packages. Force Package 1 is "forces required to mitigate WMD effects in order to save lives"; Force Package 2 is "forces required to prevent injury and contain secondary effects"; Force Package 3 is "forces required to provide temporary life support".¹⁸ Central to the force package concept is that the FPs range from very specific and specialized CoM tasks in FP 1 (such as initial assessment by a unit such as the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force [CBIRF]) to more general tasks in FP 3 (such as bulk supply distribution by a combat service support unit). Deployment timelines also vary with each FP. The force package concept is a good way to determine what units may actually participate in CoM, and allows JTF-CS to tailor subordinate forces based on needed *capabilities*. This process of force selection will utilize units *suited* to the CoM mission and should discourage the phenomenon of various units re-missioning themselves for CoM. The subordinate TFs of JTF-CS must offer real contributions to the actual mission, not complicate the process.

Task Force Liaison, as one of the JTF-CS subordinate TFs, has a role that potentially parallels the ICE of the JTF-CS staff. Once again, the complexity of coordination with both military and non-military agencies will be extensive, so one can assume that TF Liaison will play a central role when the JTF is employed. However, as with all the functional TFs, TF Liaison is not a permanently subordinate unit. The functional TFs, once activated, will draw

on existing capabilities by tapping into available units that employ the required specialties on a day-to-day basis. For TF Liaison however, the equation is different due to coordination issues and the time needed to establish working relationships. The lack of a permanent coordination mechanism within TF Liaison level could prove troublesome. A better idea is to establish a cadre of TF Liaison that is permanently assigned to JTF-CS and works closely with the ICE directorate. By establishing a core cadre of TF Liaison, that critical mission area is addressed and requires no costly "start-up" time. Furthermore, the cadre can engage in pre-incident liaison activities with FEMA and other CoM related agencies and develop standing operational procedures that will enhance the overall effectiveness of the JTF. The next area to review is the Command Relationships that affect the JTF organization.

Command Relationships

Thus far, examination of JTF-CS is tracking along with what one would expect from a joint task force. For the most part, the JTF is well organized, with noted exceptions, and has an appropriate mission. The command lines are clear when looking at the CINC to JTF relationship, and the relationship from the JTF to its component TFs. However, the interagency and military relationships external to JFCOM are imprecise and may pose a substantial challenge to unity of effort.

Whenever a JTF is designated, military planners look closely at command relationships. Joint doctrine states that "unity of effort in joint forces is enhanced through the application of the flexible range of command relationships" and that "joint force command relationships are an array of options that joint force commanders can use to adapt the organization of assigned forces to situational requirements and arrange component operations in time, space, and purpose".¹⁹ Command relationships with respect to JTF-CS can be analyzed in two ways --

relationships with the forces that will directly fill out the operational structure of the JTF and relationships with units/agencies external to the JTF. .

The clear command relationships from the CINC, through JTF-CS, to the functional TFs have already been addressed. It is also clear that JTF-CS only acts in a supporting role, "in a crisis, when requested by a LFA and approved by the Secretary of Defense".²⁰ So far so good. But due to the lack of familiarity, the interface between military and civilian organizations will test relationships.

In most military operations, relationships are viewed in terms "supporting command" and "supported command". Degree of control can be expressed as operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON). JTF-CS is a military organization, however, the LFA is not. The JTF is neither OPCON nor TACON to the LFA designated to be in charge of the crisis. The command relationship between JTF-CS and the LFA (most likely FEMA) is that JTF-CS is *in support of* the LFA, but still remains under the *command* of JFCOM.²¹ This loosely defined command relationship may present operational advantages for the JTF. By maintaining a loose command relationship with the LFA, the JTF is less subject to having its support functions underutilized due to LFA mismanagement. In this way, JTF-CS can support the operational requirements of the supported agency, based upon identified needs and not direct orders. In other words, the LFA will identify requirements, leaving the details to the JTF, thereby preserving the synergy gained from focused employment of all assets. Keeping JTF-CS under direct command of JFCOM also has advantages. In addition to being tasked with consequence management responsibilities, Joint Forces Command is the CINC designated as the Joint Force Provider of assigned CONUS based forces.²² JFCOM has a huge stake in the success of JTF-CS and is in a position to use the command's leverage, as

one of the five geographic CINCs, to ensure that JTF-CS gets the forces required to respond effectively to a crisis. JFCOM should also be adequately influential within the interagency community to facilitate relationships that might extend beyond the normal scope and influence of the two-star JTF-CS commander.

The clearly defined chain of command within the JFCOM sphere of influence is strong, and the senior command will ensure the success of the subordinate. The "supported and supporting" relationship between the JTF and the supported LFA is achievable and makes sense. Complications arise when additional players are added to the pool of WMD CoM providers. Were a CoM event to occur today, other agencies would contribute to the effort. In the event of any disaster (including a WMD event), local and state agencies have responsibilities as "first responders", prior to FEMA's arrival as the overall coordinator for the federal support effort. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, will also respond. Detailing local, state, and NGO roles is beyond the scope of this paper, other than to point out that they are trained professionals that have a valid role and bring bona fide capabilities to crisis response, but also complicate the landscape.

In addition to FEMA and various civilian organizations, there are other agencies from within the defense community that may be in "competition" with JTF-CS at the incident site. The possibility of additional military responders undermines the principle of unity of command/unity of effort. As stated earlier, the primary response headquarters was to shift from a service lead (DOMS), to a joint lead (JFCOM) for the specific mission of consequence management.²³ For conventional MSCA operations, such as disaster relief, the Army structure of executive agency has remained in place. The RTFs, under direction of the CONUSAs retain the mission to support MSCA much in the way that JTF-CS is designed to

support a WMD-CoM operation. The principle of unity of command dictates that JTF-CS should be the only military response headquarters for WMD-CoM. The problem is that it is not clear that the Department of the Army has relinquished control of the CoM mission. Having established working relationships via their MSCA preparation, the CONUSA RTFs could possibly arrive at an incident site along with JTF-CS, to which the civilian agencies ask, "who's in charge?" and both units reply, "we are". JTF-CS cannot function effectively with competing interests of this nature. The supported LFAs must have a clear understanding of who is in charge prior to a possible event. Therefore, JFCOM and the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary for Civil Support) need to rectify the issue without delay. DoD must police it's own house with respect to command relationships.

At this point in the evolution of the CoM mission, the National Guard is very actively seeking a major role, and has been earmarked for a big piece of the CoM response pie because they are viewed as "our forward deployed" forces for domestic operations.²⁴ When considering command relationships that will involve JTF-CS, the National Guard should be included in the discussion. The National Guard enjoys a unique status among military organizations because they remain under control of the governors of the respective states, via the adjutant general of each state, unless federalized.²⁵ Legally, the governors enjoy much more flexibility when employing the National Guard under *state* control during an emergency than if the same Guardsmen were federalized.²⁶ Similarly, any federal military forces, both active and reserve, are limited in the scope of their activities. The most widely known law that applies to restrictions of federal forces within the U.S. is the *Posse Comitatus Act*.²⁷ This is an important issue in planning response to a WMD event. A governor may be wise to request federal assistance and also retain control over his National Guard. This

would create a relationship at the incident site in which JTF-CS has command over assigned federal forces, but must establish a coordination relationship with the National Guard. Furthermore, the Guard has ten certified WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs), and with the support of Congress, is planning to establish additional teams. The CSTs have political support and plan for response operations for all WMD CoM events. Like it or not, JTF-CS will never secure a clear and simple military command relationship with the CSTs or the National Guard. The issue should be addressed now to reduce future complications.

The assessment of the various command relationships reveals that there will be some challenges ahead for the JTF-CS. Defining straightforward command relationships will be difficult due to the complexities that arise from a new and highly visible mission, political considerations, and a perceived threat to the U.S. homeland. The challenge can be addressed by applying a common sense approach in defining clear-cut relationships that facilitates JTF-CS mission accomplishment.

Recap and Recommendations

This paper has examined JTF-CS from an operational framework of mission, organization, and command relationships. As with any operational organization that is tasked with a new mission, the road ahead is not simple. The JTF-CS framework is strong in some areas, and requires improvement in others. Are we on the right track?

Recap on Mission, Organization, and Command Relationships

The mission for JTF-CS is sound. The Nation has identified a need for military support to civil authorities during a consequence management event within the United States, its territories, and possessions. Tasks have been delegated via the chain of command (in a

manner addressed in joint doctrine), and a joint task force has been stood up to support the mission. The new JTF has conducted a mission analysis and developed a coherent and easily understandable mission statement. The mission of JTF-CS can be easily communicated to all agencies likely to be involved in CoM, both military and non-military alike. With respect to mission, JTF-CS is on the right track.

The basic organization of JTF-CS is sound. The JTF headquarters is based on standard military organization, modified as needed to accomplish the mission - an indicator that JTF-CS is mission oriented. What is not clear is how the JTF will "flesh out" its functional TFs that actually support the CoM mission.

The command relationships surrounding JTF-CS run the gamut from clear to enigmatic. Among the areas addressed, command relationships demand the most attention. An easy solution is not readily available, and unfortunately, many relationships are beyond the immediate control of JTF-CS.

JTF-CS may be on the right track, but the commander and staff of this standing JTF will be working hard every day to keep their organization focused, relevant, and able to effectively support consequence management.

Recommendations to Remain on the Right Track

First, the mission is solid, but the JTF-CS should continue to promulgate the mission statement to those agencies and units that will participate in consequence management. It is critical that all agencies involved in CoM understand and acknowledge the JTF-CS mission.

Second, JTF-CS should refine the organization of the JTF with respect to the component task forces. There are political as well as operational issues evident in force selection because many units (especially among the Reserve Components) desire involvement in the

CoM mission area. Force selection must be based on capabilities and should not degrade warfighting capabilities. Moreover, force selection should be driven by JTF-CS via JFCOM, not by units seeking new missions and additional resources. Recommendations are:

- Choose the right force for the right job. Simply labeling a Reserve unit as "forward deployed" within CONUS, does not make it suitable for WMD CoM. For example, an Army Reserve Chemical Company may be appropriate, while a Marine Reserve Rifle Company or an Air Force Reserve flying squadron may not. This is clearly a "total force" mission where capability and response time are critical factors in the selection of appropriate units. Federal mobilization of the Reserve may not be conducive to rapid response; therefore capable units from the Active Component may be the forces of choice.
- Continue to use the "force package" approach in response options.
- Explore the option of establishing a "core cadre" for TF Liaison that works daily under the staff supervision of the ICE.
- Develop "habitual relationships" with units that will work for JTF-CS. Most notably with those units that have CoM-type capabilities (CBIRF, chemical decontamination units, etc.)
- Examine the pros and cons of having specific units apportioned from JFCOM for the WMD-CoM mission. These apportioned units would have to possess "high-end" capabilities suitable for the WMD mission and should not be general-purpose units.

Third, define and refine the numerous command relationships that challenge JTF-CS.

This is more difficult when moving away from the JTF flagpole. Recommendations:

- JTF-CS should have, through JFCOM, heavily weighted input in defining command relationships.
- The larger DoD community must work to streamline DoD command relationships. If a WMD CoM mission has to be executed, there must be a clearly defined chain of command running directly through JTF-CS.
- For unity of effort, the relationship with the National Guard must be clearly delineated. If the Guard works under state control, then there must be a strong coordination link. If the Guard is under federal control, then they must work for JTF-CS. There can be no ambiguity between the Guard and JTF-CS.

Finally, remember the "KISS" rule (Keep It Simple, Sir) and attempt to keep the JTF and its day-to-day business on a level that is easily understood by all players. This is much easier said than done, but can be accomplished within the JTF-CS/JFCOM circle, and expanded outward to the other agencies that have a role in consequence management.

Conclusion

A requirement has been identified for America's military to support civilian efforts in responding to a potential WMD event in the U.S. homeland by assisting in consequence management. Joint Task Force-Civil Support has been tasked with, and is responsible for, this national level mission. A JTF is ideally suited to execute the complex tasks associated with CoM and should be capable of helping further delineate the overall DoD role. The mission is appropriate, but complications still exist. To clarify the DoD support role, every effort needs to be placed in assisting JTF-CS carry out its assigned mission. JTF-CS should be the recognized lead organization within DoD for CoM, without competition from other

units. If JTF-CS is the "main effort" for WMD CoM, then, as with any other operational mission, all other units are in support and should follow the JTF-CS lead.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Chris Seiple, "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction", *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997): 121.
- ² Pamela Berkowsky and Charles Cragin, "Joint Statement Before the United States Senate Committee On Armed Services", (24 March 2000): 1. <www.defenselink.mil> [20 December 2000]
- ³ Berkowsky and Cragin, 2.
- ⁴ Department of Defense, "Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)", DoDD 3025.1 (Washington, DC: January 1993), 1,7.
- ⁵ Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, *Unified Command Plan*, (Washington, DC: 1999). Extracts edited by Gerry Dillon, US Naval War College, 12.
- ⁶ Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), "JTF-CS Fact Sheet", JFCOM Website. <<http://www.jfcom.mil/jtfcs>> [30 December 2000]
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), "Operational Focus", JFCOM Website. <<http://www.jfcom.mil/jtfcs>> [30 December 2000]
- ⁹ *Unified Command Plan* Extracts, 22.
- ¹⁰ Joint Task Force-Civil Support, "Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) Command Brief", (Norfolk: December 2000), 3.
- ¹¹ Joint Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Pub 0-2. (Washington, DC: 1995), IV-9.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Luther Tonkin, E-mail sent to author 10 Jan 2000.
- ¹⁴ JTF-CS, "Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) Command Brief", 21.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Clark Schiffer, Phonecon with author 12 Jan 2001.
- ¹⁷ JTF-CS, "Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) Command Brief", 17.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Joint Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0. (Washington, DC: 1995), II-6.
- ²⁰ Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), "JTF-CS Fact Sheet".
- ²¹ Clark Schiffer, Phonecon with author 12 Jan 2001.
- ²² *Unified Command Plan* Extracts, 11.
- ²³ JTF-CS, "Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) Command Brief", 8.
- ²⁴ Berkowsky and Cragin, 3.
- ²⁵ Kevin R. McBride, "Homeland Defense and Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Are National Guard Civil Support Teams a Necessary Asset or Duplication of Effort?" (JMO Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: May 2000), 5.
- ²⁶ Charles Doyle, *The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1995), 41-43.
- ²⁷ David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson, "Forgotten Mission: Military Support to the Nation", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Spring 1997), 112.

Bibliography

- Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission). *Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Second Annual Report. Washington, DC: December 2000.
<<http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel>> [20 December 2000]
- Berkowsky, Pamela and Charles Cragin. "Joint Statement before The United States Senate Committee on the Armed Services". 24 March 2000.
<www.defenselink.mil/specials/destruction/Berk.html> [20 December 2000]
- Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, DC: 1997.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Doyle, Charles. *The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law*. CRS Report for Congress. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1995.
- Faulkner, John M. "The Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat, Homeland Defense, and JFCOM". JMO Paper. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: May 2000.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Federal Response Plan*. Washington, 1999.
<<http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp>> [21 December 2000]
- Grange, David L. and Rodney L. Johnson. "Forgotten Mission: Military Support of the Nation." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Spring 1997): 108-115.
- Joint Task Force Civil Support. "JTF-CS Home Page". *U. S. Joint Forces Command Website*. <<http://www.jfcom.mil/jtfcs>> [30 December 2000].
- Krulak, Charles C. "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Winter 1996/97): 20-23.
- McBride, Kevin. "Homeland Defense and Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Are National Guard Civil Support Teams a Necessary Asset or Duplication of Effort?" JMO Paper. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: May 2000.
- Michalovich, Michial M. "Consequence Management 101: Forming and Deploying a Joint Task Force for Consequence Management". *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September 2000): 36-42.

- Martinez, Barbara. "Preparedness for Terrorism Response". Statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Federal News Service, Inc. June 1999. <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>> [10 January 2001]
- Payne, Keith B. "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History". *Comparative Strategy*, (October 1995): 347-359.
- Schneider, Barry R. "Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction". *Airpower Journal*, (Special Edition 1996): 36-47.
- Seiple, Chris. "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction". *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997): 119-134.
- Siegel, Adam B. "The Minimize-Maximize Continuum". *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September 2000): 30-40.
- Strobel, Warren P. "A War In The Shadows". *U.S. News & World Report*, (8 January 2001): 22-25.
- U.S. Department of Defense and The Joint Staff. *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Volume I*. Washington, DC: 1999. <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html>
- U.S. Department of Defense and The Joint Staff. *Missioning Reserve Component Units for WMD-CM and Critical Infrastructure Physical Security*. Tab 1 Follow-on Study to *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*. Coordinating Draft. Washington, DC: 2000.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Joint Pub 0-2. Washington, DC: 24 February 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Joint Pub 3-0. Washington, DC: 1 February 1995.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command. "Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) Command Brief". Norfolk, Va.: December 2000. [received 10 January 2001]
- U.S. Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. MCDP-1. Washington, DC: 1997.
- U.S. Marine Corps. "USMC View of Homeland Defense". Unpublished paper. Washington, DC: 20 June 2000.
- U.S. Marine Corps. 4th Marine Division. "Gunslinger Civil Support Exercise After-Action Report". New Orleans: 15 July 2000.
- U.S. President. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: 1999.

U.S. President. Presidential Decision Directive 39. "U.S. Policy on Counter-Terrorism".
Washington, DC: June, 1995.

U.S. Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Unified Command Plan*. 1999. Extracts
edited by Gerry Dillon, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI.